Mainland Students at CUHK and Cross-Border Cultural Tensions (2000s–2017)

⚠️ This article belongs to the "unofficial history" module (16 — Mainland Students and Cross-Border Relations). It presents multiple sources and viewpoints side by side; this archive does not adjudicate between them or endorse any side. Living individuals named in connection with specific incidents are identified only as "[Surname] Mr./Ms."; highly politicised material from 2019 onward is not covered in this article — related external sources are listed in Module 18. The "MUA" and "DQMUA" dispute following the 2021 dissolution of the CUHK Student Union is covered in a separate article, The MUA and DQMUA Dispute, and is not repeated here.

# 1. Background of Mainland Students

# 1.1 Growth in Admissions

Since the mid-2000s, Hong Kong universities, including CUHK, have been permitted under a government framework to admit mainland undergraduate students (outside the local-student quota), and numbers have grown gradually. According to CUHK's Facts & Figures 2024/25^※, non-local students (mainland and international combined) at CUHK's Sha Tin campus make up about 20% of students on UGC-funded programmes (from 2024 the government further raised the cap to 40%; see key-numbers-dashboard.md).

At CUHK, Mainland students (colloquially "內地生") are the largest group of non-local students, admitted mainly through the Gaokao-linked joint admissions scheme or universities' own admissions channels into undergraduate and postgraduate programmes.

# 1.2 Background to Cross-Border Cultural Differences

Mainland and local students differ significantly in the following respects, which form the structural basis for tension:

These differences are not monolithic — both groups contain considerable internal diversity — but when politically sensitive topics (such as democracy, localism, or historical questions) come up on campus, mainland and local students have sometimes diverged noticeably.

# 2. Democracy Wall

CUHK's campus has a Democracy Wall — a public noticeboard where students may freely post notices and political statements, and a facility symbolic of the democratic culture on Hong Kong university campuses. The Democracy Wall tradition has continued at Hong Kong universities for decades, allowing students to post any viewpoint, including political positions, advocacy, and announcements.

# 3. The 2017 Democracy Wall Standoff

# 3.1 Three Rounds of Confrontation: 4 to 17 September

According to Wikipedia^※ and reporting by the South China Morning Post^※, the episode was not a single clash but three rounds of confrontation occurring in succession over about two weeks:

• 4 September: Posters advocating Hong Kong independence first appeared on CUHK's Democracy Wall.
• 5 September: First round — a mainland female student attempted to remove independence posters, leading to an argument with students present; the incident was filmed and circulated online, prompting widespread discussion.
• 7 September: Second round — an online post written in simplified Chinese called on mainland students to come and post their own views; by evening, an estimated 100 local and mainland students (estimate) had gathered near the Democracy Wall, with both sides arguing openly and neither backing down.
• 17 September: Third round — renewed disturbance at the Democracy Wall; the same day, a larger rally "in support of national security / against Hong Kong independence" (organised by pro-establishment figures, with an estimated 2,100 to 4,000 participants) was held off-campus.

# 3.2 The "Chee-na" Controversy: A Disciplinary Investigation Triggered by One Remark

The most contentious episode of the affair took place during the second round of confrontation (7 September). According to HKFP's report^※ and the South China Morning Post's follow-up report^※, Mr. Chow, then president of the CUHK Student Union, got into an argument at the Democracy Wall with a mainland student who opposed "Hong Kong independence" and used a derogatory term against that student, telling them to 「滾回中國」("go back to China") — footage of the exchange was filmed and circulated, prompting a large number of complaints from within and outside the university.

On 8 September, the university issued a statement giving the remark its 「最嚴厲的譴責」("strongest condemnation") and saying it would launch an investigation; the statement said the student's remark 「對二戰死難者及其後代造成傷害」("caused harm to those who died in the Second World War and their descendants"). That same afternoon, about 20-odd students, mostly student union representatives, surrounded university leadership, demanding a commitment that the university would not remove banners related to "Hong Kong independence."

The investigation and disciplinary process ran for more than a month: according to the South China Morning Post^※, on 28 October the student disciplinary committee of New Asia College — the college to which Mr. Chow belonged — imposed on him a removable demerit and 40 hours of college service.

This remark became the most damaging episode of the whole affair because it shifted a free-speech dispute over "whether posters can be torn down" and "whether independence banners can be posted" onto a slur carrying historical pain — the focus of debate moved from "the right to post" to "the wording itself," and it pushed the university from a stance of neutrality toward public condemnation.

# 3.3 Spreading Further: The "Callous Posters" Incident at HKIEd and the Knock-On Effect

The CUHK incident did not stay confined to the CUHK campus. According to the Wikipedia entry on the "callous poster" incident at the Education University of Hong Kong^※, in the early hours of 9 September, posters printed in simplified Chinese appeared on the Democracy Wall at the Education University of Hong Kong (HKIEd), mocking the death of the son of Mr. Choi, then Deputy Secretary for Education — this drew near-unanimous, strong condemnation from Hong Kong society. At the same time, posters mocking Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo and his wife also appeared on HKIEd's Democracy Wall. Some commentary described the linked incidents at the two institutions as "spreading like wildfire" — a confrontation at one institution quickly prompting similar or more extreme content to appear at another.

According to Wikipedia^※, in October, flags of the Republic of China and posters marking "Double Ten Day" also appeared at New Asia College; the university subsequently removed the flags (but not the other materials), which drew protest from the student union. Around the same time, student unions from 12 to 13 institutions across Hong Kong issued a joint statement defending freedom of expression.

# 3.4 The University's Response

According to CUHK's Communications and Public Relations Office statement^※, the university issued an official statement supporting freedom of expression and the right of staff and students to express themselves within the law, while calling on all parties to exercise restraint and favour dialogue over confrontation. According to combined media reports, then Vice-Chancellor Professor Joseph Sung asked for materials related to "Hong Kong independence" to be removed, and said the university would act on its own if the student union did not cooperate; on 15 September, the heads of ten Hong Kong universities jointly issued a statement stressing, 「我們珍視言論自由，但譴責其近期被濫用……所有大學均不支持『港獨』」("we treasure freedom of expression, but condemn its recent abuse ... no university supports 'Hong Kong independence'").

# 3.5 Multiple Positions, Side by Side

According to accounts attributed to mainland students (per combined media reports), some mainland students considered the Hong Kong independence posters "offensive," and believed they had the right to post opposing views and have their own voices heard on the Democracy Wall.

According to accounts attributed to local students (per combined media reports), the historical tradition of the Democracy Wall as a space for free expression should not be broken; acts such as tearing down posters to stop others' expression infringe on freedom of speech; the student union side also stressed that condemning abusive language and upholding the right to free expression are not contradictory.

According to the university, the episode was a difference of views among students; the university's position was to safeguard freedom of expression within the law, not to support "Hong Kong independence," and to condemn abusive language, while not endorsing any specific political position.

According to the joint statement of the ten university heads, the universities treasure freedom of expression but oppose its being abused as a tool for personal attacks or hate speech.

No substantive reconciliation among these positions has been reported since; the episode reflects broader mainland–Hong Kong cultural and political-identity tensions, and the questions of "where the boundary of free speech lies" and "whether offensive speech should be tolerated" remain the core points of disagreement to this day.

# 3.6 Wider Impact

According to Wikipedia^※, the 2017 CUHK episode:

• was one of the earliest publicly documented instances of this kind of confrontation on a Hong Kong university campus; before this, mainland and local students had mostly expressed their views through separate channels, with fewer direct confrontations;
• prompted reflection in Hong Kong society on "self-censorship" and the Democracy Wall system;
• drew extensive attention from mainland Chinese media;
• set a precedent for similar ("copy-cat") incidents at other Hong Kong institutions afterward, of which the "callous posters" incident at HKIEd is a representative example.

The 2017 confrontation was, within the last period before the 2021 dissolution of the CUHK Student Union in which the union was still functioning normally, the most public and most representative eruption of mainland–local student tension. The subsequent evolution of CUHK's student-organisation landscape (including the 2021 dissolution of the Student Union and the later MUA/DQMUA dispute) is a separate set of institutional questions from another period, covered in The MUA and DQMUA Dispute and A General History of Student Movements; it is not repeated in detail here.

# 4. Everyday Tensions in Language and Cultural Integration

Beyond the 2017 episode, day-to-day tension between mainland and local students shows up in several respects (per combined media reports, with considerable case-by-case variation):

• Language: the language of instruction (a mix of Chinese and English) and classroom discussion (Cantonese/Putonghua/English) has sometimes left both sides feeling out of their depth;
• Classroom atmosphere: when historical or political topics come up, the assumed degree of openness on some subjects differs between mainland and local students;
• Housing and social life: mainland and local students sometimes tend toward their own social circles; the university also runs pairing schemes to encourage interaction;
• Identity: some mainland students find the "one country, two systems" arrangement novel, while some local students remain wary of what they see as mainlandisation since the handover of sovereignty.

These tensions do not run in only one direction — mainland students, and local students, each hold a range of differing views among themselves, and neither group should be treated as a single monolithic bloc.